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Abstract: Most international support for community policing focuses primarily if not exclusively on capacity
building of the government, namely Ministries of Interior and police forces. For structural reasons, these
organizations—in and of themselves—are often not the most appropriate partners to launch or sustain
community-oriented policing initiatives, especially in the early phases of police reform. This paper presents
an alternative to the ministry-centric approach in the form of civil society-driven programming for police
reform. Using the case of police reform in Afghanistan in the late 2000s, we argue that a focus on community
engagement, accountability, and responsiveness to the needs of the population can lead to improved human
security even in post-conflict countries. Although a grassroots approach may seem daunting international
actors more familiar with strategic advising at the ministerial level, we find that it provides an opportunity
for more sustainable and effective engagement than ministry-centric efforts alone. Our experience from
the Afghanistan case also shows, however, that a civil society approach is not a standalone—it needs to
be complemented by ministerial initiatives as government has the central role in directing police reform.
Adding a civil society component can make the official efforts more likely to succeed.
Keywords: Afghanistan; Community-Based Policing; civil society; human security; international police
advising; police reform
1. Introduction
International programming for community policing has been
trapped in an almost exclusively ministry-centric approach,
a methodology that has a high risk of failure and that can dis-
credit the concept of community policing in nations emerg-
ing from conflict such as Afghanistan where trust in govern-
ment institutions are low. The trap is composed of restrictive
mandates, inappropriate funding structures, and an overly
narrow view of the legitimate actors in police reform, all of
which falsely present ministries and governments as the
only potential partners for community policing interventions.
This results in a systemic lack of support for a viable and
promising alternative: civil society-driven police reform.
It is possible, however, to reframe the police reform de-
bate, such that community policing becomes an integral
part of participatory democracy, civil society accountability
of government, safety and access to justice. Using a frame-
c© 2020 by the authors; licensee Librello, Switzerland. This open access article was published
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work of Human Security, civil society and civil security can
find common ground. A human security framework puts
people’s security in focus, and allows for analysis of not
only multiple sources of insecurity faced by communities,
but also diversity of civil institutions (governmental and non-
governmental) which together can address people’s diverse
security needs (Human security here refers to ‘freedom
from want’ and freedom from fear’ [1–4] where the idea of
security moves beyond state security to focus on the mul-
tiple dimensions of people’s security. See the introductory
article in this issue, Nyborg (2019) ‘Emerging Perspectives
on Post-Conflict Police-Community Relations’ [5], for more
on defining security and human security). In such a framing,
community policing becomes one civil institution of many
that collectively provide community members with a more
secure existence. Police reform within such a framework
has police accountability and responsiveness to citizens as
a key element. It also brings reform firmly within the bounds
of civil society work in community development.
Most police reform efforts focus primarily if not exclu-
sively on capacity building of the government, namely the
Ministry of Interior (MOI) [6] and the police forces. For
structural reasons, these organizations—in and of them-
selves—are often not the most appropriate partners to
launch or sustain community-oriented policing initiatives,
especially in the early phases of police reform. Reliance on
central ministries and police forces as the principle partners
to initiate such initiatives can seriously hurt or even de-
rail the effort through ministerial resistance, political power
plays, delay and neglect, or through distortion of the princi-
ples of community policing. Community policing initiatives,
then, cannot produce results, discouraging further efforts.
The recognition that engagement with central ministries
and police may be critically flawed does not mean there
is no option for developing community-based police ini-
tiatives in post-conflict operations. Alternatives do exist
utilizing civil society-driven initiatives that allow community-
based policing to flourish even in early phases of police
reform. Further, such initiatives can encourage acceptance
of community-based policing by central ministries as a re-
sult of their demonstrated utility and the emergence of a
broad range of advocates. Ultimately, such an approach to
community-based policing is inherently stronger than top-
down driven approaches because it is rooted in and led by
communities and civil society.
This article describes the civil society-driven approach
which was piloted by the United Nations in Afghanistan
between 2013 and 2015, and how it demonstrates the po-
tential of a civil society to develop creative, effective engage-
ments to build public trust in police, as well as to strengthen
the willingness and capacity of police and the Ministry to
embrace community policing. The core program was com-
prised of a number of small-scale projects for community-
police engagement [7], and implemented through eight civil
society organizations in seven provinces. These areas in-
cluding some of the most remote and insecure districts of
Afghanistan. The core projects included police-community
consultations, safety outreach campaigns, relationship build-
ing between police and health care providers, legal assis-
tance, police women councils, and literacy training for po-
lice women. The complementary programming involved
police-community sports initiatives, mentoring by women’s
organizations of police women, scout-police engagement,
university outreach, police station access and information
desks/hotlines, and others.
The data used for this article stems from a variety of
sources. The main source of data is drawn from the field
experience of the lead author, who served in the Police
Advisory Unit of UNAMA for a period of three years. As
a UNAMA staff, she was responsible for the monitoring
and oversight of the core projects, as well as coordination
with the other programming, which provided a unique op-
portunity to assess both the challenges involved in design,
funding and implementation of the projects as well as the
community, police, and ministerial responses. This com-
prised extensive interviews, meetings and discussions with
project partners and participants from civil society and the
police, as well as with the international donors and poli-
cymakers throughout the project period. Additional data
on project activities and results was also available from
project reports and studies. The second author conducted
in-depth interviews with police officials, policymakers and
civil society organizations involved in the pilot activities in
several shorter field visits (to Kabul) before, during and after
the implementation of the projects. Secondary literature,
including studies of the pilots, has also been consulted.
2. Limitations of a Ministry-Centric Approach
Post-conflict [8] governments, especially Ministries of Interior
and police forces, are not typically a natural incubator for
community-oriented policing. On the contrary, central min-
istries in conflict countries, often beset by insurgency, racked
by corruption, or burdened with authoritarian legacies are
more likely to view community policing as a threat than an
opportunity. In most cases, post-conflict authorities have had
little exposure to concepts of participatory decision-making
and community partnership, and thus lack a clear under-
standing of the benefits of community-led approaches to
policing. In more extreme cases, officials may profit from
extortion and social control of populations, and fear that in-
creased accountability generated by community participation
would eventually diminish their command of resources.
At the other extreme, some governments may be eager
to institute community policing, but due to lack of awareness
or disagreement with its principles, distort it in ways that un-
dermine its efficacy. Even if a government seems to accept
community policing principles initially, centralizing control of
initiatives means that government can influence priorities
over time. Government initiatives may neglect aspects that
Ministries find undesirable (such as empowering police to
deal with gender based violence, or encouraging access
for media to press for police accountability), undermine the
concepts by selectively choosing only certain community
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groups or individuals to participate (damaging trust), or
emphasize only certain types of issues.
Examples from Afghanistan illustrate these challenges
for even the most well-intentioned Ministries. In one case,
an MOI director for community policing was extremely en-
thusiastic about community engagement, but interpreted it
almost exclusively as a vehicle for propaganda or as way
to establish auxiliary policing units in which citizens and
students would provide guard functions to supplement the
police. In another, international agencies volunteered to
reprint materials on gender-based violence created by civil
society organizations (CSOs) to provide to police for distri-
bution to victims and communities. However, the Gender
and Human Rights Directorate of the Ministry of Interior
refused because the materials were not created by the
Ministry and therefore were beyond their authorization to
distribute—the directorate was also probably reluctant to be
seen disseminating materials on controversial subjects like
women’s rights.
Where police forces were historically designed to protect
the state against the people or to extract resources from their
populations, large investments in building their capacity for
community policing may be wasted and diverted because
there is no fundamental agreement on the need for a commu-
nity orientation. Eventual government acceptance of these
concepts is, of course, a necessity if Ministries and police
forces are to ever successfully adopt and sustain community
policing. However, that kind of attitudinal change comes from
familiarity with the approaches, sustained pressure from influ-
ential advocates, and most of all, from seeing results. It is un-
likely that the international community can change longstand-
ing ministerial culture and systems simply through persua-
sion, awareness raising, or even using funding conditionality.
Thus, international initiatives find themselves in the situation
of “pushing on a string” instead of pulling it—attempting to
promote community policing with governments that have little
or no interest to cooperate. Under such circumstances, a
community policing agenda may appear futile.
3. Advantages of a Civil Society-Driven Approach
An alternative to the ministry-centric approach exists in
the form of civil society-driven programming for police-
community engagement. Although this grassroots ap-
proach may seem daunting international actors more fa-
miliar with strategic advising at the ministerial level, we
argue that it actually provides an opportunity for more sus-
tainable and effective action than ministry-centric efforts
alone. An approach driven by civil society would clearly
need to be complemented by ministerial initiatives since
government has the central role in training and supporting
police to engage their communities, thus the inclusion of
both approaches would greatly increase the chance of suc-
cess. This section explores the advantages of civil society-
driven programming, illustrated by a practical experiment
in community-police engagement in Afghanistan—pulling
on the string instead of pushing it.
3.1. Motivation
The most obvious advantage of a civil society approach
is that there is a clear incentive for communities to encour-
age improved behavior and performance from police; they
are, after all, the ones suffering most from police abuse,
incompetence, or neglect, and they have the most at stake
in building an accountable and responsive police force. In-
ternational actors can take advantage of this fact, rather
than relying on ministries whose interest level and capacity
for execution are more questionable. For example, one of
the earliest organized campaigns for police accountability
in Afghanistan came after police were implicated in (or at
least failed to prevent) the hijacking of a van belonging to
the moneychangers union, the murder of its driver, and
theft of millions of dollars. The union arranged a strike by
of all money changing services and staged a demonstra-
tion outside police headquarters until the police leadership
agreed to investigate the case and improve security in the
main money-changing district. Self-interest is a powerful
mobilizer.
However, weighing against their intrinsic motivation for
better police behavior, communities and civil society may
be fearful of engaging with police, as pressing for improved
behavior may put them at risk of retaliation. Furthermore,
many civil society organizations and communities may lack
awareness of an alternative vision of policing, and how they
themselves can push for the desired changes. CSOs in
Afghanistan balanced these competing impulses by initiat-
ing programming within the “comfort zone” of community
members, their own organizations, and the police. Activities
such as joint sports programs or teaching police to provide
basic safety information were, for the most part, uncontro-
versial, building trust on both sides and creating willingness
for both police and communities to take further steps toward
more extensive, substantive contact. Once the initial hurdle
of fear was overcome, CSOs became enthusiastic about
the possibilities of such foundational activities, suggesting
innovative techniques for engaging the police on a wide
variety of issues.
International actors can also play an important role in
terms of addressing the initial lack of awareness of com-
munity policing and roles for civil society in promoting it. In
the project in Afghanistan, the UN identified existing forms
of engagement (such as women’s groups running shelters,
organizations supporting participatory decision making be-
tween communities and civil authorities, and business as-
sociations that had conducted advocacy for government
accountability) and asked them how they could apply their
skills to more direct engagement with police. In addition, the
project sought out CSOs that had potential for productive
interaction with police (such as Scout groups, journalists
associations, and sports federations) and encouraged them
to think about ways they could contribute to police reform.
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3.2. Connections, Knowledge, Skills
The second advantage of civil society in promoting reform is
that it is more likely to have the connections, knowledge and
skills needed for successful community policing initiatives,
something that Ministries and police forces may lack in early
stages of police reform. For example, most Afghan civil soci-
ety groups agreed that regular consultations between police
and communities were essential for progress toward ac-
countability, but that no appropriate forum existed. Existing
dialogue structures (such as the Afghan National Solidarity
Program’s community development councils) were reluctant
to include police out of fear that police would exploit their
projects. It was also problematic to have police organize
the consultations, as they tended to invite only the power
brokers with whom they were already familiar rather than
an inclusive range of society. The level of mutual distrust
and hostility between police and people made it essential
to use a trusted intermediary from civil society to facilitate
the initial “entrée” for police to meet with communities. Fa-
miliar with community concerns, several CSOs were able
to convince a wide range of community representatives to
participate. The organizations then used their expertise in
dialogue to create a constructive climate for police commu-
nity consultations, employing communications and conflict
management training and processes for expectation setting
and vision building, to eventually reach joint agreements
and action plans. They were able to diffuse tensions and
facilitate relationship building throughout the course of the
workshops and follow-up meetings—actions outside the
capability of the police to manage.
Along the same lines, civil society can offer police the
ability to draw on its resources in a way that reduces the
burden on police and makes them look good at the same
time, using a simple concept: referral to services. Some
services may be provided only by civil society (such as
shelters, counseling, hotlines), but with civil society coop-
eration, police can learn to refer victims to those services
appropriately. For example, one provider of a counseling
hotline for domestic violence provided a brochure to police
so that they could refer victims to the hotline, even when the
police could not provide other victim services. In another
case, an Afghan women’s organization developed a strong
relationship with the MOI and police districts in Kabul. The
MOI regularly sent 20-30 police at a time to the CSO to be
trained on domestic violence. The training provided some
exposure to ideas of gender rights but more importantly, the
CSO framed it as a way for police to solve a problem that
had been plaguing them: how to provide necessary (but to-
tally unavailable) services to victims. An officer complained
to the CSO about the problem of women victims who ar-
rived at nighttime; he said the police had no options on
where to keep them. The CSO representative responded,
“If that happens, call us, we’ll come to pick up the woman
and keep her in a shelter for the night and bring her back
in the morning for the investigation”. The police officer was
astounded. “You can do that?” The CSO in effect offered
the police a referral service to the organizations that could
provide shelter, legal aid, and counseling services for which
the police themselves had no resources.
Even in regard to projects that theoretically could be
executed by a Ministry itself, such as development and
delivery of training, civil society has added value. CSOs
are more likely than ministries and police academies to be
early adopters of new pedagogical approaches for adult
learning. Traditional police training structures in the devel-
oping world tend to rely mostly on rote learning and lectures,
while CSOs likely have been exposed to participatory tech-
niques like role play, practical exercises, etc. Civil society
involvement in the development of training can help ensure
that such practices are integrated, making the content of
training more valuable, especially when the training is in-
tended for interactions with civilian groups, such as youth.
Furthermore, CSOs may be better positioned to improve
the process of training development, engaging stakehold-
ers to create continuing relationships between police and
other entities they need for future success. Finally, civil
society participation in delivery of training provides a con-
crete example of commitment to partnership. With their
involvement, police trainees from the start see civil society
in an official capacity, as instructor or as fellow trainees,
legitimizing continuing interaction with them in a way that
preaching about cooperation in theory cannot. Early civil
society participation can also create ongoing relationships
with those government offices responsible for curriculum
development and training.
In Afghanistan, there are numerous examples of this ad-
vantage of civil society participation—and counterexamples
when the opportunities were missed. One of the most suc-
cessful police initiatives was the safety outreach campaign:
police were trained to deliver safety briefings on fire, traffic,
mines, first aid, floods and earthquakes to schools and com-
munities. Dozens of CSOs contributed to the development
of the idea, identifying improvement in the police relation-
ship with children and youth as a priority, and suggesting
interactions based on safety and security. Ultimately, the
UN contracted a communications consulting firm to develop
the materials and curriculum, and to train and mentor the
police. (The Ministry of Interior was given several chances
to initiate and manage the project, but chose not to do
so.) The company made an intensive effort to include civil
society and governmental stakeholders: it involved safety
and disaster agencies in providing input to the curriculum
to align it with their own safety approaches. CSOs such
as the Afghan Red Crescent Society even took part in the
training of police instructors; some safety agency person-
nel attended events at schools to observe. Coordination
with the Afghan Child Protection Network of NGOS and
government agencies ensured that the approach would not
put children at risk through association with police. Po-
lice and CSOs jointly conducted outreach to education de-
partments—using the CSO contacts— that could authorize
police access to schools to deliver the briefings. The con-
sultant involved police and the Ministry in the contacts with
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CSOs throughout the process, with the result that police
experienced positive interactions with a number of key or-
ganizations who could partner with them in the future.
The involvement of these other agencies ensured higher
quality of content than if the course had been developed by
MOI alone. In addition, the process of engaging civil society
created several side benefits: it gave CSOs and commu-
nities a chance to raise concerns about the approach (e.g.
police engagement of schools that could put schools at risk
of targeting by insurgents); it generated their own interest
in the success of the project; and it encouraged them to
explore further contact with police on related issues such
as disaster response and preparedness. The training de-
partment of the Ministry was so impressed by the products
that it asked for the firm’s help in developing additional
models, such as on drug awareness. These types of materi-
als, when developed in conjunction with local organizations
working in that field, can expose police to another sector of
society whose cooperation they desperately need for their
own success.
Perhaps the most important factor in the success of the
project was that it enabled police to provide a tangible ser-
vice to communities—not propaganda about cooperation,
but a sincere demonstration of what the police can do, with
minimal resources, to improve the quality of life of their
communities. This was a direct result of the motivations of
the actors involved: the organizations driving it were at the
core interested not in improving perceptions of police (as
perhaps a Ministry would be), but in improving the actual
behavior of police.
In a related effort, various sports federations and clubs
showed interest in building relationships between police
and people, and improving police fitness, teamwork, and
anti-drug mentality through sports. In response to a query
of whether they would arrange for police teams to play civil-
ian teams, one federation leader looked shocked. “No,” he
replied, “The police are in such bad shape that they would
always lose, and that would cause more tension!” Instead,
they proposed a project in which police and youth from
the community would train together, forming a joint team
that would play against other local teams in monthly tourna-
ments. This project was extremely popular with police and
citizens, creating channels for cooperation on reporting and
fighting crime, drugs, and terrorism. Civil society not only
had the motivation to initiate the projects, but also managed
it in a way that was more participatory than a Ministry-driven
project would be: participating athletes were drawn from the
community (not just from existing associates of the police),
venues were offered not only inside police stations but at
sports centers in town, and the federations used their ex-
tensive connections with existing teams to encourage them
to participate in tournaments. Again, this is an effort the
Ministry could have led itself but did not - if it had, might
not have achieved the same level of participation that a civil
society lead was able to provide.
In terms of using civil society participation in delivery
of training as a visible commitment to continued partner-
ship, the UN encouraged the Ministry to invite each of these
groups involved in the initial community policing initiatives
to present their approaches in the first courses on com-
munity policing at the Afghan Police Staff College. The
presence of civil society as trainers sent a clear message
to police participants that the Ministry and police leadership
endorsed interaction with civil society actors. It showed
that the Ministry considered them legitimate partners, with
the implication that continued engagement with civil society
by police in the field was acceptable, an important mes-
sage in a police system that traditionally is disapproving of
engagement with outsiders.
In contrast, the advantages of drawing on civil society
skillsets were missed in projects that focused exclusively
on ministry ownership. In one example, a civil society group
with experience in training civilian ministries on gender main-
streaming proposed to develop a course on anti-harassment
techniques for police women, who face high levels of ha-
rassment from their colleagues. The course would teach not
only self-defense techniques, but also approaches to pre-
vent, stop, and report harassment in a system that is largely
indifferent to the problem. The capstone of this innovative
project was to train the police women to then deliver the
same training to university students, helping them to protect
themselves from similar problems on campuses, demon-
strating the valuable role that police women can play, and
building trust between police and students. Unfortunately,
the one international organization that agreed to fund the
project imposed the condition that the curriculum would be
developed and delivered to police by international and min-
istry trainers rather than through engagement with the local
group. That approach would not only miss the chance to
expose the Ministry and police to local approaches to deal-
ing with harassment, but more importantly would lose the
opportunity to build relationships between the Ministry and
a group committed to combating harassment. Such relation-
ships could contribute in the long term to a flow of expertise
between police, civilian agencies, and civil society, building
momentum on the issue rather than a one-off intervention
by internationals that may produce a good curriculum but
no continuing relationships.
3.3. Social Pressure
A final area where civil society shines is in the critical
role of “naming and shaming.” Social pressure can be a
powerful tool in police accountability. In the case above
of the CSO that provided gender training to police, the
CSO kept tabs on their graduates, and if these police did
something positive on women’s issues in their district, the
CSO made a point of writing them a certificate of appreci-
ation. One police commander framed the certificate and
hung it up in the police station—an indicator of how much
the police wanted to be recognized for doing the right
thing. Schools in Helmand sent similar letters thanking
the police for briefing the children on safety. School girls
asked to have their picture taken with the police woman
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who visited the school to brief on safety, and one told her
“you look awesome in your uniform and someday I will
become a policewoman”. As a police officer explained
what to do in case of flood, a boy stood up and told the
assembled children and teachers that his family had sur-
vived a flood because his brother had attended a previous
police briefing. A spontaneous movement to appreciate
Afghan security forces sprang up among youth groups
after a police officer foiled a suicide attack; the groups
paid for billboards thanking police for their heroism and
mobilized a Facebook campaign to honor the police. For
Afghan police accustomed to widespread public derision,
these public examples of appreciation were tremendously
moving and created a strong sense of pride in what they
were doing.
Unfortunately, donors in Afghanistan missed the oppor-
tunity to institutionalize such public displays of appreciation.
Afghan CSOs had recommended that the Ministry of Interior
hold a community policing awards ceremony in which each
CSO participating in community policing activities could
identify the most active police officer in its project for an
achievement award. The Ministry and CSO would award a
prize or certificate jointly, so that the police would receive
official endorsement of the CSO honor. Because of min-
isterial reluctance to involve civil society in leadership of
the awards process, donors instead held several events in
which community policing awards were presented mostly
to high level police officials by the International Community,
without input or participation by the communities the police
were supposedly serving.
Counterexamples of public shaming (or at least vocal
criticism) of police behavior, were a common feature of the
Afghan community-police consultations. Somewhat sur-
prisingly, the police mostly took the criticism calmly and
promised to do better. At least some of these promises
were not empty: follow-up meetings moderated by CSOs
reviewed action on the demands from previous meetings
and in many cases, police leaders had indeed taken action
to discipline or remove problematic officers. Often the most
effective pressure was directed towards family members of
an abusive police officer, to rein in their kinsman. Another
approach was to utilize radio or TV “call in” shows like one
that Sabah Media did weekly for traffic police complaints,
featuring senior traffic officials who would respond to callers
and report any corrective action taken. These types of
“naming and shaming” efforts were not systematically docu-
mented so distilling good practice for this role of civil society
requires further examination.
3.4. Limits of a Society Driven Approach
It is important, however, to recognize the limits of the civil
society contribution to police reform, especially in terms
of its constrained scope. Activities to build high level pro-
fessionalism and technical law enforcement capacity are
mostly outside the purview of civil society—that is not its
comparative advantage. Most conflict-affected nations are
also faced with a more basic task of changing the mind-
sets of both police and populations, and establishing the
basic foundations of trust between them. Small steps to-
wards building that trust can set in motion a virtuous cycle
that enables higher-level capacity building: support among
the population allows more effective recruiting, which con-
tributes to more effective training, better service delivery
and improved retention. All of these lead to increased pro-
fessionalism of the police, which further increases public
trust. The initial process of building a foundation of trust and
cooperation is one that civil society can effectively set in mo-
tion, which in turn can create conditions for more effective
investment in technical capacities. Moreover, programming
that focuses on making police technically proficient before
instituting processes for accountability is problematic. If not
accompanied by progress on accountability and responsive-
ness, international technical efforts to train and equip police
forces may merely produce better predators.
At the same time, civil society may lack access to police,
or authority to engage police in activities. Some form of
“top cover” or “open door policy” from the side of the min-
istries that officially encourages or permits police personnel
to meet with civil society can facilitate early efforts by civil
society to invite police to participate in police-community
initiatives. In Afghanistan, the creation of a community
policing directorate gave civil society a point of entry to
propose activities. Although understaffed and largely un-
empowered, the directorate had enough authority to sign
introductions to provincial police chiefs, providing some le-
gitimacy to the CSOs attempting to engage them. Later,
some provincial community policing teams sponsored by
the International Community proved extremely helpful as a
gateway for civil society to reach other police and persuade
them to participate. These police teams, while small and
weak in their ability to influence policy, had the ability to
secure participation of police women by arguing the case
to their colleagues rather than relying on civil society to do
so. The function of these types of gateways is discussed
in more detail below in terms of the role that the IC can
take in building connections between civil society and state
approaches.
Despite its limitations, a civil society approach to commu-
nity policing can lead to better results than dependency on
Ministerial initiatives alone. Participatory police reform trans-
lates to stronger support and ownership by a range of advo-
cates who can support a more innovative and sustainable
approach. In fact, these principles are already recognized
in policies such as the 2013 Secretary General’s report on
Security Sector Reform [9] which extends the concept of
national ownership from “state-centric” to “whole-of-society”
ownership, or the UN Department of Peacekeeping Oper-
ations Policy on UN Police, which states, “United Nations
police shall pay attention at an early stage to those aspects
of institution-building that can serve to strengthen the in-
tegrity of host State police institutions by enhancing their
capacity to be held accountable for the performance of their
duties including when they commit human rights violations”
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[10]. The potential of civil society driven approaches is rec-
ognized but—more often than not—neglected, a reality that
will be explored in the following section.
Variations in Police Motivation
When considering the advantages of civil society-driven approaches, it is important to differentiate between the
Ministry/central leadership of police, and the local police commanders in the field (in Afghanistan, at the provincial and
district levels). In contrast to ministries, the latter have a strong, if mixed, stake in improving community engagement. This
creates openings to engage these unlikely allies in a way to generate momentum and demand for community policing,
even when Ministerial attitudes are more hostile. Lower level commanders have very different needs and perspectives
than the Ministry, falling somewhere between civil society and the MOI in terms of their interest to engage in community
policing. In many cases, these commanders do profit from exploitation and are obligated to use extractive techniques that
provide a flow of payments upward to their patrons. But at the same time, they would also benefit directly from improved
information sharing and problem solving with communities.
For example, in one Afghan police-community consultation, the people explained that their major concern was illegal
quarrying of the local dam: apparently, looters were taking stones from the dam and the villagers were afraid it would
collapse, damaging their homes and fields. The district police commander—largely uninterested in the entire subject but
aware that some kind of gesture was needed—offered to send a regular patrol to the dam. To his surprise, the patrol
worked, scaring away the looters. And even more surprising to him, the people were so grateful they started approaching
him with information about suspected IEDs, telling him they did not want him to be hurt. For the commander, relating this
story, this was an epiphany—when you listen to the people and respond to their concerns, they give you information
that saves your own skin. For commanders, better relations with community can directly translate to tangible benefits
in terms of information that protects their lives (very important), or that enables them to do their job (somewhat less
important). These incentives do not apply to officials in central ministries who are distant from the direct and constant
physical threats faced by police working in the field.
Another factor influencing local commanders in support of police-community engagement, though perhaps with less
weight than other interests, is the feeling of satisfaction and self-respect the police derive from community engagement
activities and from the associated admiration of the people as described above.
When exposed to the potential benefits of community policing, local commanders can make cost-benefit calculations on
the proper extent of cooperation with their citizens. They may be unable to completely eliminate extortion, given the
context of patronage and payment in which they operate, but they can moderate their behavior and the extent of the
extortion in order to reach a working arrangement with citizens. Even more importantly, the police can decide to provide
an actual service to communities that may offset some of the resentment of their extractive activities. The implication for
civil society driven initiatives is that civil society can draw on potential supporters at the sub-national level, in spite of any
resistance from national levels, making success more likely.
4. Obstacles to Adopting a Civil Society Approach
With these obvious advantages, why we do not see more
widespread and concerted utilization of civil society in police
reform interventions? There are many projects for police-
public interaction in conflict zones, but most of these are af-
terthoughts to a core approach of engaging the government
rather than a focused effort to integrate civil society into
police reform. A more detailed analysis of the Afghanistan
case provides insights as to why civil society—so often
the darling of international programming—has largely been
sidelined when it comes to policing.
In Afghanistan, successful experiments in civil society
police reform were met with brief applause, and then ig-
nored as donors and implementers continued to work al-
most exclusively with government institutions—institutions
that had repeatedly failed to show active interest in com-
munity policing. This disinterest confounded the civil soci-
ety groups and their police partners, whose activities had
produced the exact results advocated by the international
proponents of community policing, while the ministerial-
focused efforts were lackluster at best and oppressive at
worst [11]. In spite of their successes, civil society groups
were left out of any serious discussion on strategies for
police reform, and found few donors willing to build on their
momentum. Almost across the board, the imperative for
“Afghan Ownership” of police reform inevitably translated
into “Ministry of Interior Ownership” rather than considering
buy-in from the wider society or even other branches of
government.
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A basic explanation of this pattern is that there was
no analysis that could have objectively weighed the cost-
benefit of a civil society approach against a ministerial one
for Afghanistan. Planners and donors had nothing but anec-
dotal evidence, which was insufficient to draw them out of
established ways of doing business. The Afghan case also
pointed to two fundamental frustrations for these types of
initiatives: the gap between the development community
and police reform actors, and the strong focus on state
institutions and statebuilding, both of which we address in
detail below.
4.1. Mind the Gap
Of these two challenges, arguably the most problematic is
the wide gap existing between the development community
and the institutions usually involved in traditional, ministry-
centric police reform. Community policing falls into the gray
area between them, with both sides reluctant to bridge the
gap. For example, donors, advisors and implementers who
focus on strengthening civil society’s ability to insist on good
governance, governmental accountability, and effective ser-
vice provision largely exclude policing from their mandate.
This is a curious phenomenon, considering that police are
an important primary point of contact between community
members and the government, but often require consider-
able improvement in terms of delivery of justice and law
enforcement services to communities. Part of the problem
could be the international community’s practice of defining
civil police reform as a part of its broader security sector re-
form initiatives, rather than as a part of government service
reform. In doing so, policing becomes a part of a kinetic
military counterinsurgency strategy, with a focus on hard
security within a militarized paradigm, which prevents the
police from engaging with communities in ways with might
build trust. In such militarized contexts, it becomes even
more difficult for civil society to approach police as a civil
institution, which results in a strict divide between those
organizations who focus on community mobilization and
civil society initiatives on one side, and those who work on
police capacity building on the other. The gap could be
directive (for example, USAID has explicit restrictions on
training or capacity building for police) or could reflect ethi-
cal preferences (humanitarian-oriented organizations that
find engagement with security forces uncomfortable or dis-
tasteful). The security community has its own constraints,
in terms of a limited definition of what constitutes police
training and a reluctance to involve actors from outside the
security sector. While this paper critiques the execution
of the military mandate in this specific case, these issues
suggest a more fundamental need to reassess the appro-
priateness of the selection of the military for police training
in future interventions.
An immediate impact of the gap between the secu-
rity and development communities is the unavailability of
funding to support community policing initiatives, espe-
cially those involving civil society. The starkest examples
come from the Combined Security Transition Command for
Afghanistan (CSTCA), the major player on security sector
reform, with resources at that time of $1 billion per month to
spend on the army and police [12]. From the outset, CSTCA
claimed that it did not have authority to fund programs that
benefit the community, but only programs that directly bene-
fit the police. The problem here, however, lies in the military
understanding of what constituted “direct support to police”.
CSTCA interpreted this in its own military context (namely,
training to shoot, move, and communicate) rather than in
a framework of a police service providing access to justice
and safety services. When presented with a proposal for
community-police consultations—a core component of com-
munity policing initiatives throughout the world—CSTCA
procurement officers responded, “Can you leave the com-
munity out of it? Then we can fund it” (They later relented
slightly, suggesting that their funds could provide tea at
meetings, but only for the police participants and not for the
community representatives). CSTCA’s lawyers also vetoed
a proposal to train the police to deliver briefings to children
on fire safety because “fire safety education is not part of
the police mission”. CSTCA and the military command in-
terpreted the purpose of safety briefings as an educational
service for the public, rather than a core police function. In
fact, the military claimed that it could not assist the police
to do anything “that benefits the public” since this would
invalidate the entire police training mission. With few police
experts to advise them otherwise, military lawyers contin-
uously blocked initiatives for engagement between police
and people. A year-long struggle to authorize such police
outreach activities specifically in CSTCA’s congressional
language resulted in allocation of $7 million for community-
police engagement pilot projects developed and driven by
CSOs. However, that decision was discarded by the next
rotation of commanders and lawyers; the projects were
cancelled, and those funds reallocated to police salaries.
It is not only within the security sector that funding silos
have a negative impact on programs that cut naturally across
traditional funding borders. For example, the primary funding
vehicle for police reform, the Law and Order Trust Fund for
Afghanistan (LOTFA), rejected a project to encourage net-
working between police domestic violence response units
and health care providers to increase mutual referrals on
gender-based violence [13]. LOTFA claimed that it could not
use funding designated for the Ministry of Interior to train
staff from the Ministry of Public Health. The absurdity of
these restrictions—imagined or otherwise—did not reduce
the severity of their mpact on police programming that re-
quired intergovernmental or societal involvement. Repeatedly,
essential programming for community policing—by its na-
ture a crosscutting, multi-sectoral program—was blocked by
funding structures designed for single ministries or purposes.
The structural problems of the donor community threat-
ened community policing in more subtle ways as well. Avail-
ability of funding to support initiatives was key in encour-
aging Afghan CSOs who were typically focused on social
welfare to look past their natural boundaries to take a role
38
in police reform. Such funding was, for the most part, not
forthcoming. As the UN began to disseminate results of its
community-police engagement pilots and search for ways
to integrate them into the mainstream of police reform, it
quickly became clear that LOTFA was the only option for
sustained, serious funding. Most international actors were
reducing their presence and insisted that their contributions
take only one channel rather than investing in multiple av-
enues for police reform. In effect, that meant virtually all con-
tributions were channeled through LOTFA. However, LOTFA
faced serious restrictions in supporting civil society-driven
initiatives, as it worked under a National Implementation
Modality (meaning that MOI must approve any program-
ming and procurement). MOI was suspicious of contracting
to entities outside MOI instead of building internal capacity
(an understandable and legitimate concern) and was even
more reluctant in contracting involved NGOs and civil so-
ciety, which it viewed as competitors or even usurpers of
government prerogatives (a rather less legitimate concern).
In some cases, it saw the funding of NGOs as an admis-
sion of lack of government capacity to absorb and execute
funds (one which the government did not want to make).
Therefore, proposals for civil-society driven projects were
generally viewed by MOI as non-starters.
LOTFA also faces challenges related to its donor struc-
ture, which demanded a comprehensive plan that limited
grassroots experimentation and bottom-up approaches.
Even LOTFA’s procurement structures were problematic,
requiring competitive bids that discouraged CSOs from ad-
vancing their own creative ideas for programming—if they
did so, their idea could then be sold to the lowest bidder.
LOTFA did not have a functional grant modality that would
allow CSOs to design and implement their own innovative
approaches. Furthermore, integration with the full justice
chain and Rule of Law approaches was often blocked due to
limitations on participation of justice sector agencies and on
transfers of funds to UN agencies. Consequentially, LOTFA
was only able to identify a limited number of community
policing activities that it could support, which focused on
remote strategic interventions rather than people-to-police
contact and actual service delivery that could affect quality
of life, access to justice, and public trust in police.
Other police reform donors had equivalent difficulty in
gearing themselves for a civil society approach. One of the
largest sources of expertise on police reform was the Euro-
pean Union Police Mission. The EU used its own seconded
police officers to deliver training and had limited options
for providing grants or contracts to Afghan CSOs. Some
EUPOL officers made strong efforts to coordinate their own
mentoring activities with ongoing civil society initiatives, but
EUPOL was not a viable source of financial support for civil
society police reform projects.
The development-security divide also limited support for
community policing through traditional grant mechanisms.
Community-police engagement proposals were largely un-
able to tap into grant programs for community mobilization
and rights initiatives. This was due either to explicit donor
limitations on engaging the security sector, or to lack of
competitiveness of relatively riskier initiatives characterized
by little proven experience, lack of a willing governmental
partner, and general fear of involvement with the security
sector. For example, a DFID-sponsored grant program tried
to prioritize community policing, but not a single proposal for
police-community engagement was approved, even though
some of the same organizations received approval for pro-
posals they submitted on non-police projects. Many grants
mechanisms were aimed only at registered NGOs, meaning
that other types of civil society (professional associations,
sports federations, unions, and research/consulting firms)
with good ideas were automatically ineligible to apply.
The funding challenge is not just about making dollars
available to local CSOs for initiatives. Funding determines
which organizations will work in this field, who will bring
expertise to it, who will take the lead in decision making and
planning, and who will serve as the advocates with host
governments about priorities and approaches. In recent
cases, international military personnel took the lead for po-
lice reform, prioritizing capacity for kinetic operations over
justice service delivery. Police reform needs to include a
wider range of actors to represent the full range of roles
played by the police, and to draw on the full range of ca-
pacity building assistance. For example, the development
community has a wide range of participatory, qualitative
and quantitative evaluation and quality control mechanisms
that the security sector reform institutions have not yet de-
veloped. These would be useful to adequately guide and
monitor new approaches to engaging communities and po-
lice. In one well-intentioned effort, advisors trained police
to deliver counter-IED training to schools, but a subsequent
review found that the course might unintentionally have
taught the children how to make their own pressure plates.
Improvements in design processes to take account of the
broader impacts and possible unintended consequences of
new activities on communities could lead to more effective
outcomes.
While it may seem that resolving the constraints on fund-
ing for civil-society driven programming requires a simple
increase in flexibility on the part of donors to make space for
it in their programming guidelines and priorities, this would
involve a formidable awareness raising effort: advocacy with
hundreds of different organizations to affect their respective
agendas and bureaucratic imperatives. An alternative is
to work through training programs for international police
advisors, exposing advisors to the potential of civil society-
driven reform, and providing them tools and resources to
harness it. Since there are only a few dedicated training
schools or courses to prepare international police advisors,
targeting these key courses could be more effective than tar-
geting the large numbers of donors directly [14]. This would
allow for a concerted effort to raise awareness with the
personnel who can shape and advise programming of their
respective donor offices and counterparts. However, these
advisors would still have little power to influence changes
in underlying organizational constraints. Interested donors
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or the training programs could consider an initiative to ex-
pose the participants of advisor training to the ideas of civil
society-driven reform, and then, once they are in-country,
to provide these ‘graduates” access to dedicated funding
to support civil society-proposed projects to engage police
and communities.
One relevant aspect of the ICT4COP project is to de-
velop a training course for advisors on engaging civil society
and other actors to strengthen community policing. If this
course could be associated with a grants package that the
advisor could direct to promising civil society initiatives, it
would not only encourage advisors to participate in the
course but would give them the resources necessary to
bridge the funding gap. Another ICT4COP initiative has
been the establishment of a Police Expert Network, where
international police advisors, national police, national civil
society organizations and academia meet to share experi-
ences and create information platforms which can provide
police advisors and national counterparts with resources
for use in their specific reform processes [15].
4.2. Government-Focused Statebuilding
A second factor limiting any embrace of a civil society ap-
proach by the international community is the natural prefer-
ence of international coalitions, embassies, and even the
United Nations to deal almost exclusively with state counter-
parts, especially when “statebuilding” is the stated goal of
the mission. There are a number of possible explanations
for this preference:
• International actors, like host governments, may shy from
a civil society approach because it may imply that the gov-
ernment is not sufficiently committed to a community polic-
ing agenda. (Although, alternatively, sending a message
to ministries that there are alternatives to relying solely on
ministry partners might encourage officials to find new ways
to cooperate with civil society).
• The International Community may be averse to
community-driven processes because they are less pre-
dictable—and controllable—than bilateral interactions with
a central government, and therefore carry higher risk of
heading in directions that are not consistent with the priori-
ties or values of the donors. In one accountability project,
an NGO trained community groups to monitor donor-funded
construction projects to ensure compliance with standards
[16]. One community discovered that a contractor was
building a school with substandard bricks which could be
crumbled in the hand. When other interventions failed, the
community finally organized a sit-in on the road to block
the trucks bringing the bricks until the contractor agreed to
use higher quality materials. The NGO proposed to apply
the same monitoring process for the construction of police
stations, with the goal of building cooperation between com-
munities and the police who would use the stations. Upon
hearing about the brick protest, CSTCA contract managers
responsible for police station construction vetoed the initia-
tive. Building a capacity for civil resistance is not high on
the agenda of most international aid programs, even if it
could be a key factor in promoting good governance.
• The International Community tends to focus on a na-
tional, state-determined definition and standard of com-
munity policing. A frequently articulated concern is that
variations in civil society approaches around the country
will create fragmentation and confusion in national police
planning. This is in direct contradiction to widespread accep-
tance that local communities in conflict-affected countries
may have widely divergent needs and that community polic-
ing is an intensely local undertaking. Diversity in community
policing is not fragmentation: enabling people to find local
solutions allows national structures to choose from a va-
riety of methods that they can then integrate into formal
training and procedures, highlighting community policing
as being a collection of activities which together improve
police-community relations, trust, and accountability, rather
than one particular expression. Exacerbating the fear of
diversity, some international advisors mistakenly conjoin
the question of diversified local approaches to community
policing with the wider debate over police models (usually
centralized vs. regional police). They see variations in
community policing across the nation as endorsement of a
regional model, which politicizes the debate on community
policing, when it is really separate and distinct from choices
on a national police model.
Ultimately, the state-focused argument has some legiti-
macy: community action may be desirable, but at the end
of the day, if it is not integrated into the curriculum, training
courses and operational doctrine, it cannot genuinely and
sustainably affect the police and their operations. What the
international community has not yet fully recognized is that
the civil society driven approach can actually strengthen
the likelihood of ministerial support for community policing.
Options for the International Community to promote this are
provided in the subsequent section on statebuilding.
4.3. Statebuilding through Civil Society
A civil society approach to community policing would seem
blocked by the fixation on ministerial capacity building. But
the international predisposition towards working with state
counterparts has the best of justifications: to succeed, the
intervention must produce an improvement in state capac-
ity for good governance and delivery of services. This is
even truer for policing than most sectors. Without sufficient
buy-in to community policing by the Ministry and central po-
lice commands, their control over personnel, training, and
operations would rapidly nullify any advances made by civil
society with their local police.
The answer to such concerns lies in institutionalizing
the linkage between civil society driven approaches and for-
mal state/ministerial capacity building. International actors
can assist the “feedback loop” so that civil society initia-
tives become sustained within the formal police and other
government structures. Fortunately, not only is it a natural
process to absorb community-driven activities into a Min-
40
istry, it could actually be more effective than starting with a
governmental approach alone. There are a number of po-
tential transmission mechanisms, which international actors
can act to strengthen.
Demonstration Effect: As argued above, a ministry might
not have the motivation or interest to launch community
policing programs themselves, when its officials do not yet
have a “visual” of the activity and how it will benefit the
Ministry. But a Ministry often would embrace these activ-
ities if it could see them “in person”—when it could see
tangible results and gains made by them. Working through
organizations that do have the right motivation can create
a reality that a Ministry can see, appreciate, and adopt for
itself. A good example is the Afghan police safety outreach
campaign, developed within civil society structures, which
ultimately produced a low effort, high impact initiative that
was appreciated by participants and improved the image of
police. Photos of students looking up at police with awe and
admiration, and to testimonials from commanders about the
positive public response, prompted MOI to act swiftly to ex-
pand the project. International actors and civil society can
reinforce the demonstration effect by engaging strategically
with the ministry, inviting key decision makers and strate-
gic communications/training departments to observe the
activities, and using media coverage to make MOI aware of
the image impact that the programs can have. International
advisers to the Ministry can also help the transmission of
best practices from the civil society initiatives to formal po-
lice operations by encouraging inclusion in curriculum and
training activities.
Advocacy: As more communities and police staff are ex-
posed to the programming, new allies emerge who can help
advocate with MOI for expansion. Gradually, a consensus
develops that the engagement activities should be a stan-
dard operating procedure for police. For example, shortly
after the Afghan police started safety outreach in Herat, the
Provincial Police Chief received calls from principals and
teachers for police to visit more schools. In another exam-
ple, Parliament—an important actor, given its connection
both to civil society/communities and its oversight role of
police—started to put pressure on MOI to expand civil so-
ciety programs for women police once it became aware of
their results. Convincing MOI to adopt community policing
without this support “lobby” is much more difficult than when
multiple sectors of society are demanding that change. Ad-
ditionally, national advocates can press for change over
time to sustain reforms, rather than depending on short-
term international pressure.
A New Generation of Leaders: As noted above, com-
manders at the district and provincial level are often more
receptive of community policing concepts because they
benefit directly and personally from improved relations with
their communities. Over time, many of these junior leaders
will rise through the ranks, taking that experience with com-
munity policing with them, with the ability to promote it on a
wider level. Where promotion is linked to their results in the
field, there may even be a process of natural selection at
work to move the proponents of community policing faster
through the ranks. In at least one case in Afghanistan, an
officer was promoted on the basis of his work in community
policing: his proven ability in managing community interac-
tions made him the prime candidate to handle sensitivities
of elections security [17].
Even in the shorter term, police “converts” to community
policing can lobby for increased attention to it, or simply
institute the institutional changes themselves that will help
them consolidate and expand the activities. For exam-
ple, in the project to strengthen links between police and
health care providers, workshop participants were able to
make small changes in their own working routines that later
spilled over (either through advocacy with leaders or simple
adoption of good practices) into the Ministries’ operating
procedures. Police staff also identified creative ways to use
the techniques introduced by civil society more broadly. For
instance, after becoming familiar with briefing schools on
safety, one community policing team used the first aid brief
as an icebreaker with the taxi unions. Once the union repre-
sentatives were sufficiently impressed with police concern
for their wellbeing, the police announced, “Now we can talk
about licensing and registration!”.
This concept of the “new generation of leaders” point
and the previous point on advocacy can mutually reinforce
one another. A strong grasp of community policing concepts
is—to a much greater extent than more technical police
skillsets—dependent on individual personalities; both at the
implementation level (for example, a policeman who on his
first visit to the Boy Scouts jumps in to play along in a game
of musical chairs) and at the policy level (a ministry official
who risks official censure by encouraging access of CSOs
to internal decision making), success of community policing
requires the right person in the right job. Still, the right per-
son may not stay in the right job, due to frequent turnover
of police and ministry officials—indeed, there may possibly
be more frequent turnover of community policing “converts”
due to their experimentation with the unfamiliar concepts
of community policing. To sustain progress, the new gen-
eration of leaders must be nurtured and protected by the
advocacy community, and their gains institutionalized.
Receptors: An important factor in the success of civil so-
ciety initiatives in Afghanistan is whether civil society had
a sympathetic point of contact, a “receptor” inside the po-
lice force/Ministry. An office that is dedicated to community
policing issues can provide a point of entry for civil society
and can take the lead in disseminating results and advo-
cating for expansion. As demonstrated with the community
policing directorate supported by the UN and provincial com-
munity policing teams sponsored by EUPOL in Afghanistan,
the reception point can be somewhat weak to start, and
may be just enough to provide a point of entry and internal
translation for the civil society organizations on the outside.
One civil society project for police to mentor boy and girl
scouts on safety and rule of law struggled the first year
with only eight police participants. With the introduction of
the nascent community policing teams and a directorate in
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the Ministry, police participation grew to hundreds by the
following year. The directorate and the teams (only six peo-
ple each in seven provinces) were not very strong initially,
but were able to reach their colleagues and manage the
bureaucratic hurdles more effectively than outsiders. Ideally,
those receptors would be able to take credit for successes,
contributing to their own growth. Due to a capacity building
mandate with the Ministry, a key role for international com-
munity is to encourage authorities to create these types of
reception points. Interestingly, focal points such as com-
munity policing teams/directorates may not be doctrinally
correct as a long-term solution, because they risk isolating
community policing from mainstream operations. However,
in the short term they empower civil society initiatives that
can then build the wider buy in for longer-term reform.
Finally, these effects are not mutually exclusive: The
example of Afghan Police Women Councils combined a
number of these approaches. A network of women’s CSOs
worked to strengthen police women in Afghanistan with the
goal of providing better access to justice for women. They
assisted the women police to network with each other, to im-
prove advocacy skills so that they could negotiate effectively
with their commanders, and to reach out to communities
to develop allies. The first experiments were quite suc-
cessful, resulting in improvements in facilities and more
support for women police, including involvement in assign-
ment decisions and response to workplace harassment.
The Ministry, however, reacted defensively to the possibility
of police women pushing for their own solutions, afraid that
their advocacy would damage the reputation of the Ministry
and create competition for centralized gender affairs de-
partments. It ordered the police women to stop interacting
with the CSOs and dissolved the new police women coun-
cils. Intervention by allies in the international community,
CSOs, and Parliament helped the Ministry to understand
the tool that the networks provided and resulted in estab-
lishment of terms of reference for police women networking
that benefited both the Ministry and women. The councils
have since been incorporated into the Gender, Children and
Human Rights Department, where they have established a
hotline for women police to report harassment issues and
procedures to review cases. This highlights the role that the
international community can play in integrating civil society
experiments into sustained ministerial efforts.
5. Conclusion
Practitioners and researchers are slowly coming to recog-
nize the value of community policing approaches, not only
in maintaining order in relatively peaceful states, but in coun-
tering insurgency, combating terrorism, and building govern-
ment legitimacy in interventions in conflict-affected countries.
There is growing recognition of an untapped potential for
community policing to contribute to trust-building, peace-
building and stabilization in conflict-affected communities.
Rather than capitalizing on this potential, however, the
standard ministry-centric approach to community policing in
conflict-affected states may in fact limit or even extinguish
its potential to improve security and to build public trust in
government.
International interventions can address the barriers to
entry for civil society to initiate effective community policing
programs by creating funding and institutional space for
civil society engagement of police as an alternative to the
ministry-centric approach. In order for this to happen, we
suggest the following:
• Create funding mechanisms that provide support for com-
munity policing directly to civil society rather than only to (or
through) ministries. These mechanisms can emphasize the
importance of integration into ministerial systems so that
programs are not conducted in isolation of the government,
but the basic principle would be to give responsibility to civil
society to drive the initiatives.
• To further encourage civil society action on police re-
form—and acceptance of it by divided donor communi-
ties—the activities with the most potential for effective civil
society engagement should be documented and the as-
sociated training and materials collected, as is common
with ministry-centric materials. Such a library of techniques
and products could be shared with CSOs and donors to
empower and to mainstream civil society action on policing.
• Focus ministerial advising efforts on creation of channels
for civil society to access and influence the ministry, allow-
ing civil society to incentivize and pressure the ministry over
time, rather than attempting direct Ministerial reforms that
have weak internal support.
In effect, this approach would apply to police reform the
core—if often neglected—tenet of development: Empower
people to build their own future rather than building it for
them. In police reform, a sector that quintessentially au-
thors the redistribution of power between the people and
the state, it is even more essential to empower the groups
that want accountability and provision of fair, effective ser-
vices, rather than those who use their power to deny them.
Police reform initiatives must stop pushing on the string and
instead begin pulling it.
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society initiatives in order to provide effective security and safety
services.
[14] One example is the International Police Advisors Mas-
terclass, organized by DCAF/ISSAT. More information at:
https://issat.dcaf.ch/ara/Learn/SSR-in-Practice/Countries-
Regions/Canada/International-Police-Advisors-Masterclass.
[15] Ganapathy J, Damkaas T, Næsje A. A Bird’s Eye View: from the
Field—Is a Police Experts Network (PEN) the missing link in fa-
cilitating sustainable Community-oriented Policing in Post-Conflict
contexts? Journal of Human Security. under review.
[16] Integrity Watch Afghanistan Community Monitoring Project.
[17] Chief of Police e Mardumi team in Ghor in 2014 was transferred to
lead elections security after his successes in negotiating with citizens
during community protests over police operations.
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